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ABSTRACT
There have been an increasing number of arguments on a national and an 
international level, both academically and practically, on “professional skepticism in 
auditing.” The internal and external environments surrounding independent auditors 
have resulted in an eroding of professional skepticism and have threatened to weaken 
society’s trust in auditors. Professional standards have long emphasized an appropriate 
degree of skepticism in the entirety of the evidence process, which is composed of 
planning audit programs, performing audit procedures, and evaluating the audit 
evidence. Auditors are expected to understand that the essence of skepticism is “raising a 
question” and “exhibiting a questioning mind,” yet this is not enough to prevent audit 
failures resulting from insufficient skepticism.
Professional skepticism in auditing is a hybrid concept constituting the epistemic 
and psychological aspects of cognition. The former is related to a way of knowing and 
fundamentally deals with what approach (positive or negative) the auditor should adopt 
prior to designing the evidence process. The latter is related to the auditor’s disposition to 
raise a question in a particular audit setting and fundamentally deals with measuring the 
depth and breath of the auditor’s questioning mind. 
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Research on professional skepticism has been in progress for some time, yet appears 
to have been inclined toward the second aspect and to have almost overlooked the first 
aspect. To address the first aspect, this paper presents a conceptual framework of 
professional skepticism which can contribute to improving audit quality.
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Toward a Conceptual Framework of 
Professional Skepticism in Auditing
I. Introduction 
Increasing professional skepticism on the part of auditors is a highly urgent theme 
to which the worldwide accounting profession is now paying significant attention. It has 
been repeatedly emphasized in numerous venues such as the European Union [EC 2010], 
the Auditing Practices Board [2010 and 2011], the Financial Services Authority and the 
Financial Reporting Council [2010], the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA [2010]) and, most recently, the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board [2011]. For instance, the AICPA response to the European 
Commission Green Paper (EC [2010]), emphasizes that professional skepticism is a 
critical skill and that research should be undertaken to assess how professional skepticism 
is implemented and “to explore the behavioral elements that may compromise 
professional skepticism, for example, auditor behavior which is influenced by individual 
biases and paradigms”([2010], 2). More recently, the chairman of the PCAOB has 
asserted that the foundation of a public accounting audit is “independence” and 
“professional skepticism” (Doty [2011]). 
More fundamentally, professional skepticism needs to be rooted in honesty and 
trust. It does not imply a philosophy of either dishonesty or distrust (Burton [1980]). 
When an auditor perceives dishonesty and ceases to trust management, it is fundamental 
that the auditor withdraw from the engagement. President Reagan’s famous words on the 
occasion of arms negotiations with the Soviets, “Trust, but verify,” apply, just as well to 
professional skepticism in auditing (Grumet [2003]).
The question “How should we increase the quality of the financial statement 
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audit?”(Peecher et al. [2011]) is related to inward skepticism (Bell et al. [2005]), one 
possible form of professional skepticism in which auditors question the appropriateness of 
their own judgments as well as the effectiveness of the process through which these 
judgments are made.
Although the importance of professional skepticism has been emphasized in 
different ways, the common underpinning is “How can auditors exercise the right degree 
of professional skepticism?” Improving professional skepticism is not easy, however, 
because the degree of skepticism to be exercised is positively or negatively influenced by a 
variety of factors.
In addition, the “audit culture” (Doty [2011]) and “audit firm culture” may weaken 
professional skepticism. For example, a longer tenure may make the auditor less 
challenged, less skeptical, or compromised (Deis and Giroux [1992]; Shaub and 
Lawrence [2002]; Carcello and Nagy [2004]; Bedard and Johnstone [2010]). The SEC’s 
requirement of engagement partner rotation reflects the danger from an auditor’s loss of 
healthy skepticism. In this sense, a mandatory rotation of accounting firms (as auditors), 
which would lead to a change in the audit culture, might influence the degree of 
professional skepticism applied. Assuming that this audit culture will not change in the 
short term, however, it is necessary to improve the auditors’ mindset toward professional 
skepticism. This, simply put, is the issue in professional skepticism with which the 
accounting profession is faced. 
Hurtt ([2010],150], an influential researcher inthis field, understands professional 
skepticism as “a multi-dimensional individual characteristic.” This view is in line with the 
her prior research (Hurtt [1999]; Hurtt et al. [2008]) viewing it as an individual trait 
rather than as a response to audit circumstances. To be sure, judgments are indebted to 
individual auditors’ personal traits. However, this view oversimplifies the complicated 
compound nature of the auditor’s professional skepticism. Although Hurtt appears to 
have narrowed her view from that in her previous research, she states frankly the problem 
facing research on professional skepticism: 
Because of the lack of clear understanding about what constitutes professional 
skepticism, it can be difficult to compare or draw conclusions among accounting research 
studies that address professional skepticism.  (Hurtt [2010], 150)
Almost all previous research on (or related to) professional skepticism, Hurtt not 
excepted, has been inclined toward the psychological/behavioral aspect of professional 
skepticism (Shaub [1996], [2004]; Choo and Tan [2000]; Quadackers [2007]; Nelson 
[2009]) and has overlooked its epistemic aspect. Researchers may have taken for granted 
86
that the auditor’s epistemic activities are basically “confirmation,” although some 
empirical studies already suggested that “confirmatory behavior may not prevail or 
dominate in the audit judgment process”(McMillan and White [1993], 463), and also 
that such epistemic activities must not be “falsification” at all in a philosophical sense. 
But, any discussion on professional skepticism needs to start without any preconceived 
ideas. 
II. A Historical Sketch of Skepticism in Auditing
How has the concept of skepticism in auditing been recognized? In this section, its 
conceptual development is explained chronologically, before further analysis is added.
The largest problem currently facing researchers is the lack of a commonly accepted 
definition of “skepticism in auditing”(Bell et al. [2005]; Nelson [2009]; Quadackers 
[2009]; Hurtt [2010]). The most commonly cited definition focuses on the psychological 
aspect of audit cognition, that is “the auditor’s questioning mind.” This definition only 
emphasizes that the auditor should have a questioning mind when evaluating the 
evidence and does not see skepticism as a way of knowing. 
Origin in the 1950s
In its release on the McKesson & Robbins case of 1938, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) asked auditors to “go into an audit with a copious amount 
of skepticism”(AICPA [1988e], 84).  This case release may be the beginning of the 
emphasis on “professional skepticism.” 
An extensive survey of the accounting and auditing literature indicates that 
“skepticism” initially referred to its ordinary meaning, not to a concept 1. The author 
believes that it first appeared as “an attitude of healthy skepticism” in a paper entitled 
“Professional Standards” (Wilcox [1952], 12). Wilcox used the term to amplify the 
“professional due care” to be paid by an independent auditor. He understood professional 
skepticism as the attitude an auditor should have when handling evidence and considered 
it a healthy attitude. 
1 The author conducted an extensive survey to know how “skepticism” or “professional 
skepticism” has been used by searching the words in the electronically converted full texts 
of the accounting/auditing journals (The Accounting Review; Accounting, Society, and 
Organization; Accounting Horizon; Journal of Accountancy; Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory; and The CPA Journal ).
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Developments in the 1960s
The organization which has continuously stressed the importance of professional 
skepticism with a warning is the SEC. Cohen ([1966], 58), a past Chairman of the SEC, 
expressed his concern about the profession’s understanding of professional skepticism. 
We wonder whether auditors sometimes forget that a basic qualification of their 
calling is that they have a healthy skepticism and look at the business operation as a whole 
rather than as a series of isolated technical questions.
The Philosophy of Auditing (Mautz and Sharaf [1961]), which is ranked (by the 
author) as the  established classic of audit literature and which continues to influence 
audit thinking, introduced the concept as one of the ways of obtaining human 
knowledge:
 Skepticism. To these five positive methods (authoritarianism, mysticism, rationalism, 
empiricism and pragmatism: parenthesis added) of obtaining evidence in support of 
ideas and beliefs, Montague adds a sixth and negative method, that of skepticism. 
The value of this way of knowing is at once apparent to an auditor. (96)
Later, Mautz [1967] amplified skepticism as follows:
 In addition to the five positive ways of knowing, there is a sixth and “negative” 
method of particular importance to auditors. This is the method of skepticism. To 
be skeptical does not mean to be impossible to convince. Rather it suggests an 
attitude toward evidence best described as rational evaluation. (63, emphasis added)
Unfortunately, in his subsequent writings, Mautz did not go beyond introducing 
skepticism. Auditing scholars as a whole at that time did not deeply explore skepticism in 
auditing. In spite of Mautz’ insight, the subject has not so far been approached 
philosophically.
Developments in the 1970s
Audit failures in the early 1970s showed the regulatory agency (SEC) that merely 
emphasizing the importance of professional due care was not enough and marked the 
beginning of increased SEC activity. In its Accounting Series Releases (ASR) #153 [1974] 
the SEC first recognized that audit failures were in part due to a lack of professional 
skepticism:
 Such information indicated that Touche failed to obtain sufficient independent 
evidentiary material to support its professional opinion in regard to a number of 
highly material transactions which were constructed by management in such a way 
as to make it appear that income had been earned when in fact it had not been. In 
connection with these transactions it also appeared that Touche failed to fully 
88
appraise the significance of information known to it and to extend sufficiently its 
auditing procedures under conditions which called for great professional skepticism 
(emphasis added).
ASR #153 further emphasized that the skepticism of an auditor should always be 
healthy. Since ASR #153, when judging the quality of auditing procedures or considering 
the cause of a failure, the SEC has continued to apply the "professional skepticism" 
perspective and has strengthened its professional skepticism stance. 
It is not clear when the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
first recognized the importance of professional skepticism. From the literature survey, it 
appears that the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Cohen Commission: 
[1977 2]), an independent commission of the AICPA, first officially recognized the 
concept. SAS No.16 refers to the term only to emphasize that “the auditor should plan 
and perform with an attitude of professional skepticism”(par. 6). The Cohen Commission 
Report ([1978], 38) emphasized that:
 The exercise of professional skill and care requires healthy skepticism—a disposition 
to question and test the validity of all material management representations. The 
independent auditor should approach an examination with an open mind about the 
integrity and good faith of management. He should neither assume that 
management is dishonest nor take management’s integrity and good faith for 
granted. The auditor’s tests of the validity of transactions and resulting financial 
statement amounts or other evidence may cause him to question management’s 
honesty or good faith.
In spite of these insights by the Cohen Commission Report, the concept of 
“professional skepticism” was not immediately reflected in the subsequent revision of 
Statements on Auditing Standards. To most accountants at that time, professional 
skepticism was no more than one of the tools for defensive auditing (Chazen and 
Solomon [1975]). 
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts (ASOBAC [1973]) recognized the problem 
of observational errors in the investigative process. ASOBAC identified four causes of 
observer errors: (1) a lack of observational ability (knowledge/skills), (2) a lack of 
objectivity (a possible bias held by the auditor), (3) destruction of the environment by the 
observer, and (4) the problem of indirect audit evidence. ASOBAC (30) briefly explained 
2 The Cohen Commission recognized the concept of professional skepticism in its 
tentative report ([1977], 38).
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(1) as follows:
 We observe only what we know how to observe. What we accomplish by education, 
experience, imagination, and skepticism is to see more than meets the eye (emphasis 
added).
“See more than meets the eye” means bringing one’s questioning mind into full play 
to identify whether any false statements, contradictions, or irregularities are hidden in the 
financial statements, accounting books, and records. In other words, the auditor does a 
“smell test” to find a clue to any inconsistency or irregularity among the audit evidence 
Anderson ([1977], 125), influenced by ASOBAC, identified (1) the competence of 
the observer, (2) observational bias, and (3) a lack of professional due care as factors that 
cause errors in observations and which may affect even professional auditors. He further 
identified three factors that may cause a mistaken observation: “indirect audit evidence,” 
“destruction of audit evidence by the observer,” and “the risk of not identifying suspicious 
situations,” and then characterized all of them as ascribable more or less to a lack of 
“reasonable skepticism.” It is not clear, however, how he interprets “reasonable 
skepticism.”
From a professional skepticism perspective, the 1970s can be deemed a prelude to 
the revisions of Statements on Auditing standards of the next decade. Without stressing 
professional skepticism in the audit evidence process, particularly within the GAAS 
framework, the depth of auditing procedures as a whole cannot be attained.
Developments in the 1980s
The 1980s saw the conspicuous development of skepticism in auditing. Brown and 
Calderon [1993] pointed out, for example, the inverse relationship between the two 
general categories (lack of independence and lack of professional skepticism) causing 
audit failures which the SEC cited in the enforcements for the years 1980-1989: 
independence was cited less while skepticism was cited more. The SEC continued to 
express, at every opportunity, its anxiety that “auditors are not showing enough 
skepticism in carrying out audits” and that “they seem ‘too eager to please their 
client”(AICPA [1985a], 34), and to stress that “independence and skepticism are factors 
in the exercise of judgment”(AICPA [1987]) and that “to provide adequate training for 
auditors and other accountants to develop inquisitive minds, sound analytical skills, 
skepticism and professional integrity”(AICPA [1988]).
In response to repeated audit failures (e.g.  United States vs. Arthur Young [1984]) 
due to inappropriate audit judgments, the accounting profession (AICPA) issued 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53 [1988], which included the first official 
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statement on professional skepticism under the so called “Expectation Gap Project”(Guy 
and Sullivan [1988]). SAS No.53 tied professional skepticism exclusively to audit 
planning and performance, but without a clear definition of the term.  It characterized 
skepticism first as neutral  in that the auditor should neither trust nor distrust 
managements, and second as prescriptive in that it was referred to in relation to Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards. As far as professional standards are concerned, skepticism at 
this stage seemed to be simply associated with the field work. A heightened degree of 
professional skepticism was stressed, particularly in the face of the increased risk of 
related-party transactions or material misstatements (Wiesen and Carmichael [1983]).
Developments in the 1990s 
In response to increasing SEC concerns and public criticism of the profession, in 
1992, the Public Oversight Board of the AICPA established the Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness (Shaun F. O’Malley, Chairman), consisting of eight members, in response to 
a request from the Chairman of the SEC (Arthur Levitt) to examine the effectiveness of 
the existing audit model. It took more than seven years, however, for the Panel to finalize 
its study. 
In 1993, the Public Oversight Board of the AICPA issued a special report which (1) 
stated that auditors were not sufficiently sensitive to the degree of professional skepticism 
required by auditing standards and (2) asked accounting firms to assure more consistent 
implementation of professional skepticism (POB [1993]).  
In 1997, the AICPA issued SAS No. 82, which modified the discussion of 
skepticism in SAS No.53. In a further development, SAS No.82 viewed professional 
skepticism as the key quality of professional due care and referred to it in relation to the 
“general standards” rather than “the standards of field work.” In addition, professional 
skepticism was featured as substantive in nature in that it represented the substance of 
professional due care the auditor should exercise.
SAS No.82 began to catch fire in audit scholars’ minds in such a psychological way 
as to raise the question “What factors influence the auditor’s questioning mind 
(professional skepticism)?” In response to this question, Kennedy ([1995], 9) suggested 
that “some mechanisms of debiasing the curse of knowledge are potentially conducive to 
professional skepticism.”
SAS No.82 also prompted practicing auditors to pay more attention to the effect of 
a skeptical attitude in ferreting out misstatements. For example, it emphasized that the 
auditors must “follow up any potentially material negative indicators to determine 
whether or not financial statements are free from material misstatement” (Groveman 
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[1995], 83). In other words, to audit practitioners, professional skepticism meant that 
they must take nothing for granted and “must be more sensitive to the possible existence 
of fraud and watch out for uncorroborated responses to inquiries” (Barnett et al. [1998]). 
Developments in the 2000s
On August 31, 2000, the Panel at length published its report, The Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness Report and Recommendations. The Panel, distinguishing a financial 
statement audit under GAAS from a “fraud audit” or a “forensic audit”(76), gave insight 
into professional skepticism in reference to a “forensic-type fieldwork phase” as follows 
(88):
 Not unlike the traditional planning, interim, final, and review phases of audits, this 
new forensic-type phase should become an integral part of the audit, with careful 
thought given to how and when it is to be carried out. A forensic-type fieldwork 
phase does not mean converting a GAAS audit to a fraud audit. Rather, the 
characterization of this phase of a GAAS audit as a forensic-type phase seeks to 
convey an attitudinal shift in the auditor’s degree of skepticism.  
“A forensic-type fieldwork phase” may imply that auditors should replace their 
current neutral view of professional skepticism with a presumption of the possibility of 
intentional/material misstatements and should use “‘retrospective auditing procedures’ in 
which they would assess how various issues involving accounting estimates and judgments 
in previously issued financial statements were resolved” (Carpenter and Mahoney [2000], 
22). 
The Panel observed that the risk assessment called for by SAS No.82 is not sufficient 
in that it fails to direct auditing procedures specifically toward fraud detection and so does 
not significantly increase the likelihood that the auditor will uncover material fraud 
([2000], 86).  In addition, the Panel pointed out (86) that generally accepted auditing 
standards does not  provide adequate guidance for implementing the concept of 
professional skepticism.  
Accounting scandals at the beginning of the 21st century reinforced the need for 
professional skepticism. Beasley et al. [2001] found that a lack of professional skepticism 
was the single most-often-cited cause for the SEC’s actions against auditors. In 2002, the 
AICPA issued SAS No. 99, also entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit . This standard, which supersedes SAS No. 82, expands the discussion of 
professional skepticism, emphasizing the auditor’s responsibility to explicitly or 
proactively consider the possibility of fraud in every engagement. SAS No.99 (AICPA 
[2002] par.10?) stresses that auditors must maintain their professional skepticism 
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“regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s beliefs 
about management honesty and integrity.” Such professional skepticism requires that “the 
auditor should not be satisfied with less than persuasive evidence” (Victor and Levitin 
[2004], 27). 
Ramos [2003] evaluated the significance of SAS No. 99 as follows: “It is a standard 
that reaches into all areas of the audit process and it moves auditors in a different 
direction, away from the ‘checklist mentality’ and more into a thinking person’s audit 
(that is, a professional-skepticism-oriented audit)”(36; parentheses added). The 
perception that using a checklist may hinder the auditor’s professional skepticism has also 
been made (IAAS [2011], 72.).
SAS No.99 again raised the question “What factors influence the auditor’s 
questioning mind (professional skepticism)?” Empirical research began to target the 
question exclusively. Hurtt ([2010], 99), who perhaps pioneered research on the subject, 
empirically identified auditors’ personal characteristics as influential factors. 
The PCAOB [2008] criticized, through the summary report on its annual 
inspections, the insufficiency of professional skepticism particularly in areas that involved 
management’s most complex judgments. Accordingly, the PCAOB as well as the SEC is 
expected to focus heavily on indicators of lack of professional skepticism during its 
inspection process. 
III. Why is skepticism difficult to deal with in auditing? 
Regardless of its utmost importance, strictly speaking, not until the issuance of SAS 
No.82 [1997] did practicing accountants and audit scholars begin to pay explicit 
attention to the concept of professional skepticism. Until then, recognition of its 
importance was confined to a few academics and some accounting professionals. In 
addition, the meaning of the term “professional skepticism,” as seen in prior professional 
and academic audit literature varies (AICPA SAS No.xx; Choo and Tan [2000]; Cushing 
[2000]; Panel [2000]; Hurtt [2010]; Bell et al. [2005]; Nelson [2009]). Three issues help 
to explain why professional skepticism in auditing is hard to deal with.
Fear of increase in professional responsibility 
It is not clear why professional skepticism took so long to be officially recognized in 
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The accounting profession (as represented by 
the AICPA) might simply have had second thoughts about professional skepticism for 
almost the same reason it took so long to address “fraud.” The AICPA might have 
perceived the possibility that any explicit reference to “professional skepticism” and 
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“fraud” in official statements would result in an increase of professional responsibility 
under the so called statement audit. It is quite understandable that the accounting 
profession was concerned about such an increase, and therefore was not always receptive 
to any revision of professional standards that would increase its members’ responsibility 
and liability. Carmichael and Craig [1996] give some support to the above observation. 
Increasing complexity in the external auditing environment    
The profession’s unreceptive attitude to explicit reference to professional skepticism 
in the professional standards may also be related more to the intrinsic nature of auditing 
(conducting an audit) which includes, intrinsically, the act of questioning statements by 
another individual or the conduct of another individual. Even without emphasizing the 
element of “skepticism,” the auditor must raise questions or doubts during the evidence 
process. An auditor who lacks skepticism or a questioning mind is disqualified from 
conducting an audit. 
Why do we need to bring skepticism into academic focus, then? First, the auditor is 
generally stuck with organizational, economic, and environmental factors that may 
hinder his/her ability to exercise professional skepticism. Even though the auditor is 
prudent, skeptical, and competent if he/she fails to appropriately exercise professional 
skepticism during the evidence process, the result may be an audit failure with a 
disastrous effect on the financial community. Second, schemes for fraudulent financial 
reporting can become so extremely complex and ingenious. In some cases (for example 
the Lincoln Savings and Loan case in 1987 and the Enron case in 2001), which 
underscore the importance of professional skepticism in evaluating financial statements, 
the complexity and skillfulness of the fraudulent scheme might have overwhelmed the 
professional due care, including professional skepticism, exercised by the auditor (Benston 
and Hartgraves [2002]).
Even for professional auditors, some new areas may be difficult to handle, including 
digital documents and enormous amounts of digitized transactions (Nearon [2005]; 
Caster and Verardo [2007]), high-tech products or complex financial instruments 
(Groveman [1995]), fair value accounting with estimates heavily involved (AICPA SAS 
No.101; Martin et al. [2006]), and earning management(Akers et al. [2007]; Jackson and 
Pitman [2001]; Anderson et al. [2004]). These emerging areas should have increased the 
demand for auditors to sharpen their professional skepticism during the whole process of 
evidence. 
The evidential positiveness under which auditors behave  
Management is responsible for preparing financial statements (1) by selecting and 
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applying generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs) as deemed reasonable in the 
circumstances, (2) by maintaining reliable accounting books and records underlying the 
financial statements, and (3) by maintaining an effective system of internal accounting 
controls within the company in an atmosphere in which its corporate governance works 
effectively. Management is expected to be interested in a fair presentation of financial 
statements within the framework of GAAP. Because statements exist before auditing 
starts, the auditor presupposes that the statements fairly present the company’s economic 
affairs. This means that the auditor accepts the financial statements at face value and 
examines them with cooperation from the management.
In reality, however, no matter how much care has been taken by management, the 
statements may include material misstatements that can affect economic decisions. Or, 
management may intentionally prepare fraudulent financial statements in order to cover 
up a worsened financial position and the results of operations. In other words, any 
financial statements may include material misstatements (a financial statement risk), 
regardless of the cause. No financial statements are free from such a risk. Auditors are 
surrounded by the “positive supporting information” furnished by management, which 
has an incentive to present the statements which are with as much positiveness as 
possible, and the auditor must struggle against such positiveness in order not to be 
overwhelmed by it.  
The hidden problem for most auditors is that they have not experienced material 
management fraud (intentional material misstatements) first-hand and may be 
overconfident in presuming its absence, swallowing management’s story hook, line, and 
sinker, as often seen in audit failures. A heightened professional skepticism should lead 
auditors to challenge evidence that doesn’t make sense and to obtain additional 
corroboration of management’s explanations or representations. 
Any consideration of professional skepticism in auditing needs to begin with a deep 
knowledge of the inherent constraints imposed by the statement audit.  The very nature 
of a statement audit can weaken the ability to exercise professional skepticism and, in 
some cases, actually inhibit it. This phenomenon is referred to here as “a trap embedded 
in the auditor’s cognition under a statement audit.” Management asserts the financial 
statements to be appropriately prepared in conformity with GAAP, even if they are not. 
Ideally, all information which management provides for the auditor should be 
“supportive,” but along with the tremendous quantity of supportive information, the 
auditor may receive a limited amount of information suppressing real events. The auditor 
has a professional responsibility to uncover material misstatements (negative information) 
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that have been included, either intentionally or mistakenly.
The chief aim of this research is to establish a methodology for obtaining such audit 
cognition and to develop a possible framework which enables an auditor to break free, as 
much as possible, from the cognitive trap of professional skepticism existing intrinsically 
in the statement audit. The result of a more careful/effective cognition will be a higher-
quality audit.  
Six factors—auditors’ personal traits; the contractual, economic, and organizational 
aspects of the accounting firm; and environmental and internal factors of the client—all 
influence the depth of professional skepticism that should be exercised in a particular 
setting. These six factors do not necessarily act separately, but have a mutually 
potentiating/compound effect. A lack of professional skepticism may be triggered simply 
by an error of judgment in previous audit settings; however, it will usually bebrought 
about by the compound effects of factors which weaken or fog the auditor’s attitude 
toward raising a question or a doubt. But is a lack of professional skepticism ascribable 
only to these six factors? The author thinks that the “way of knowing” that the accounting 
profession presupposes can also limit or weaken the professional skepticism auditors need 
to exercise.
IV. General Arguments related to Skepticism in Auditing
There are two main streams of thought regarding skepticism in philosophy: 
epistemological or systematic skepticism and methodological or inquisitive skepticism. 
Epistemological (systematic) skepticism denies the possibility of any knowledge, “global 
or local”(O’Brien [2006]; Popkin and Maia Neto [2007]), “strong or weak” (Malcolm 
[1963]), and therefore does not contribute to problem-solving activities (Bunge [1991]; 
Kurtz [1992]). On the other hand, methodological (inquisitive) skepticism is constructive 
in that it is intended to solve problems in actual life, and has been strongly advocated by 
the philosopher Kurtz [1992].
From the philosophical point of view, skepticism in auditing should not take an 
epistemological (systematic) form dealing with “Can we obtain (real) knowledge?” Rather, 
it should be inquisitive or methodological  skepticism (Hurtt [1999]; Quadackers [2009]), 
which contributes to the formation of the auditor’s “reasonable and justified belief ” as to 
the statement concerned. It should be separated from “forensic” skepticism, which focuses 
only on the detection of particular human acts. 
Professional Skepticism as a Hybrid Concept
Previous discussions of professional skepticism have generally emphasized that 
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auditors should assume the honesty and integrity of the management and then associate 
that assumption with the definition of professional skepticism as to the state of an 
auditor’s questioning mind. However, SAS 99 (the source of AU316) recognizes that the 
auditor should instead focus on uncovering material misstatements, particularly those 
resulting from fraud and requires auditors to approach their task with a healthy 
skepticism. To respond to this current development, skepticism needs to be redefined.
In auditing, skepticism is a hybrid concept comprising the following two dissimilar 
areas (see Figure 1):
1)  how the auditor forms a reasonable and justified belief regarding the financial 
statements. This area is fundamentally related to a way of knowing in philosophy.
2)  identifying factors that influence the auditor’s questioning mind and measure the 
depth of professional skepticism in terms of these factors. These activities assume 
the way of knowing and are related, in psychology, to a way of making judgments 
and decisions.
Figure 1 The Hybrid Nature of Skepticism in Auditing
Skepticism
in Auditing
➡ a questioning mind ⬅ Psychology
⬆⬇
➡
a frameworl of
audit cognition
⬅
Philosophy /
Linguistics
Since a financial statement audit is conducted in an institutional environment, 
research is unavoidably subject to institutional constraints, for example those imposed by 
GAAS. Apart from such institutional factors, however, it is necessary to consider 
fundamentally what a conceptual framework of professional skepticism will look like. The 
results might give new insights into the existing arguments on verification and might also 
influence the mindset of auditors in a financial statement audit.
V. A Framework for Professional Skepticism in Auditing   
As mentioned earlier, the concept of skepticism has not been consistently defined 
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and the different perspectives in the literature have led to different definitions (Nelson 
[2009]). In auditing, skepticism is a hybrid concept which is composed of (1) a way of 
knowing which the auditor will follow and (2) the auditor’s questioning state of mind. 
Figure 2 shows an overall framework which contains four cells, each cell 
representing an auditor’s epistemic mode where the hybrid nature of professional 
skepticism is incorporated as two epistemic axes. Each cell (each epistemic mode) shows, 
in general, how deeply the auditor will be able to exercise professional skepticism in the 
evidence process. In the next sections, each axis is explained.
Figure2 A  Framework of Skepticism in Auditing
Ways of knowing
Positive approach
(substantiation)
Negative approach
(falsification)
A
questioning
mind
Neutrality I II
Presumptive
doubt
III IV
1. The First Epistemic Axis: A Way of Knowing
A clear and elementary introduction to the philosophy of science (Chalmers [1999]; 
Salmon [1967]) explains two different ways of knowing, both of which essentially belong 
to the induction method, basing a general conclusion on observed evidence. These two 
ways of knowing are confirmation and falsification—refutation by counter example 
(Quine and Ullian [1970]; Salmon [1967]). 
An auditor’s epistemic activity is far from precise in comparison with that of a 
scientist, in that the auditor not only deals with many kinds of human phenomena and 
social norms, but also must rigidly complete his task under a particular time constraint. 
What scientists and auditors have in common, however, is that their arguments and 
inferences are equally based on evidence (observed instances, observed facts, observed 
samples, etc): both stand on the same epistemic ground. Borrowing underlying thoughts 
and/or methodologies from the philosophy of science and logic will deepen the epistemic 
analysis of the auditor’s cognition in terms of professional skepticism.
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The affirmative approach: Confirmation
Professional skepticism is related to “how an auditor can verify the proposition.” 
One approach is to collect competent and sufficient evidence to substantiate the 
assertions in the financial statements. An assertion reflects management’s perspectives and 
therefore is always positive or affirmative. It is confirmed by each piece of evidence which 
lends positive support. Of course, one positive piece of evidence does not clinch the 
assertion, but each piece adds to its plausibility (Quine and Ullian [1970], 67-68). The 
more positive evidence the auditor can collect, the more strongly is the assertion 
confirmed.
This affirmative approach (here called substantiation), is inductive. Induction is the 
familiar method of verifying (substantiating) a general assertion from relevant facts, 
observed instances, or positive evidence. Substantiation is based on the idea that the 
strength of the evidence verifying the proposition increases as each piece of such evidence 
is accumulated. Thus, auditors conventionally substantiate a particular assertion by 
increasing the amount of positive evidence. The more pieces of positive evidence, the 
higher the probability of the conclusion. The positive instances (evidence) accumulated 
from various sources eventually constitute confirming evidence for the assertion.
Historically, Bacon (1561-1626), a British empiricist who sharply criticized the 
abstract theorizing of the medieval age, made the initial reference to the inductive method 
as the path to knowledge (Woodhouse [2006]). He got to the heart of our epistemic 
problem by recognizing the human proneness to favor positives (affirmatives) as follows 
([1620/1960], 51):
“XLVI
 It is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human intellect to be more moved and 
excited by affirmatives than by negatives; whereas it ought properly to hold itself 
indifferently disposed toward both alike. Indeed, in the establishment of any true 
axiom, the negative instance is the more forcible of the two.”
Although induction has been widely accepted, it involves a human (psychological) 
problem in that “when trying to collect information, people tend to seek out information 
that would potentially confirm the belief over information that might disconfirm 
it.”(Gilovich 1991, 33). The academic auditing literature (Waller and Felix [1984], 
Church [1990], Guiral et al. [2011]) suggests that auditors are likely to exhibit a 
confirmation-prone attitude toward evidence and, more importantly, that confirmation 
proneness is likely to erode professional skepticism and impair audit effectiveness. Bamber 
et al. ([1997], 250) go so far as to state definitely that “the presence of a confirmation 
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prone attitude in auditors would appear to be in conflict with professional standards.”
The substantiation (confirmation) approach to verification in auditing presupposes 
that “[t]here is no necessary conflict of interest between the auditor and the management 
of the enterprise under audit”(Mautz and Sharaf [1961], 42). This postulate (referred to 
here as “the Mautz postulate”) implies that both the management and the auditors are 
interested in the same result , that is, the fair presentation of the financial statements 
(Mautz [1958], 41). According to the Mautz postulate, management is responsible for a 
presentation that reflects the nature and operations of the company in conformity with a 
financial reporting framework, for example U.S. GAAP or IFRS. In the financial 
statements, management explicitly or implicitly makes assertions regarding the 
recognition, measurement, and presentation of information (including related 
disclosures). Auditors collect evidence to verify these assertions. 
The auditor’s cognition is basically aimed at ascertaining evidence for a particular 
assertion, not evidence that negates it. This affirmative approach, combined with the 
positiveness furnished by management, erodes or compromises the auditor’s skepticism 
during the evidence process and explains in part why in the past auditors have often made 
do with the evidence which management supplied. It implies that skepticism in auditing 
contains a structural  facet as well as a functional one. The affirmative approach has 
continued so far as the prevailing GAAS audit practice.
The negative approach: Falsification
If the auditor confines himself/herself to substantiation (confirmation) exclusively, 
he/she is likely to exhibit proneness for confirming evidence and a tendency to ignore 
negative instances or signals. Another possible approach to verification is the negative 
approach (falsification) or the counter-evidencing approach. Popper [1968] advocated 
falsification as the most powerful alternative to confirmation. 
The faslification approach emphasizes the strength of negative evidence rather than 
positive (affirmative) evidence in the verification process. In other words, the negative 
approach stresses that negation is more powerful than affirmation and maximizes the 
value of a single piece of negative evidence. Quine and Ullian ([1970], 67-68) explain the 
asymmetry between affirmation and negation as follows:
 A lawlike generalization, then, is confirmed by each of its instances. An instancedoes 
not of course clinch the generalization, but each instance adds to the plausibility of 
it. A generalization with even a single false instance, on the other hand, is 
irremediably false. Any hypothesis, indeed any statement at all, that implies a 
falsehood is itself false. This asymmetry is pure logic: what implies a truth may be 
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true or false, but what implies a falsehood is false. (emphasis added)
The negative approach (falsification), unlike the positive approach (substantiation), 
presupposes that “there always exists a potential conflict of interestbetween the auditors 
and the management of the enterprise under audit” (Robertson [1979], 31; referred to 
here as “the Robertson postulate,” emphasis added). In this approach, the auditor 
proactively designs the procedures to search for material misstatements which may result 
from error, fraud, and even illegal acts (SAS No.54). Auditors appear to have begun to 
realize the significance of holding this view, although many might still prefer to believe 
the Mautz postulate.
The negative approach to verification emphasizes that a proposition can be denied 
by a single piece of sufficiently material negative evidence. The negative approach does 
not seek the level of positive proof which the auditor needs to form his/her opinion, 
although almost all auditing procedures, of course, serve a dual purpose. The negative 
approach by itself does not determine how negative evidence should be treated, but it 
encourages the auditor to proactively search for and/or focus on negative rather than 
positive evidence, starting right from the audit planning stage. As mentioned, SAS No. 56 
(AICPA [1988]) emphasizes that auditors should apply analytical procedures in the 
planning stages of the evidence process to identify and investigate unusual fluctuations in 
financial statement relationships (symptoms indicating the possibility of material 
misstatements). The effectiveness of analytical procedures that heighten the auditor’s 
skepticism has been empirically supported (e.g.  Wright and Ashton [1989]).
Under this approach, a positive proposition is replaced by a proposition stated in the 
double negation form: proposition X is represented either as “not X” or as “~X.” 3 
3 In a strict sense, the word “proposition” should be used instead of “assertion” because the 
latter reflects the management’s perspective, and therefore is not appropriate under the 
negative approach. 
  “X” denotes a positive form of a statement. For example, proposition X implies that the 
amount of a particular account is fairly stated (= X is true). If it is not fairly stated, then X 
is denoted in a negative form (X). According to formal argument, two statements 
(propositions) are said to be equivalent in truth value, when they are either both true or 
both false, the notion of which is expressed as “≡.” When two statements are equivalent 
in truth value, they materially imply each other. This can be easily verified by a truth 
table. Two statements are logically equivalent when the statement of their equivalence is a 
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Concretely speaking, the principal/general proposition stating that “the financial 
statements present fairly the financial position, the results of operations, and the change 
of financial position of the company under audit” is regarded as equivalent to the 
proposition “the financial statements are free from any material misstatements .” The 
subordinate/elementary proposition, for example, that “the amount and disclosures of the 
accounts receivable are fairly presented” can also be regarded as equivalent to the 
proposition that “the amount and disclosures of the accounts receivable are free from any 
material misstatement.” 4 
The negative approach requires the auditor to proactively uncover any material 
misstatements (negative evidence) throughout the evidence process, starting at the ex ante 
stage (audit planning) and continuing in the on-going stage (performing audit tests) and 
the ex post stage (evaluating the evidence collected). Most of the audit resources will be 
consumed in uncovering evidence indicating “X”or giving a hint of “X.” If the auditor 
obtains material negative evidence, he/she will conclude that the proposition does not 
hold true. Not detecting of any material misstatement, regardless of the auditor’s efforts 
is, from an epistemic point of view, the same as substantiating management’s assertion. To 
put it another way, detection of no negative evidence, any material misstatement, during 
the evidence process constitutes confirming evidence for the proposition stated in a 
double-negative form (=the positive proposition) and the auditor eventually accepts the 
principal proposition as true in an epistemic sense. 
Under this approach, the auditor concentrates on searching for negative evidence 
(material misstatements) rather than positive evidence, counting on the dual purpose 
nature of audit procedures, and may be less susceptible to confirmation proneness. It is 
correctly pointed out that “further research is needed to determine under which 
circumstances confirmation proneness dominates, as opposed to a skeptical attitude 
toward evidence”(Guiral et al. [2011], 174). 
The negative approach will tend to make audits more effective but less efficient for 
tautology. A statement form X≡˜X (double negation) is proved as a tautology as shown 
by a truth table, where “˜” stands for “not.” That is, double negation is a positive.
4 The expressions “are free from” and “material misstatements” appearing in the 
proposition correspond to “do not include” (negation) and “are not correctly stated” (not 
X), respectively. “Material misstatements” is the complement of “fair presentations.” Thus, 
these two expressions constitute the double negation. A double negation is a positive 
(copi [1972], 280; Lee [2002], 285)
102
the auditor and more expensive for the client. Belief based on falsification is expected to 
be stronger than belief based on substantiation, as partially supported by Fukukawa and 
Mock [2010], but this approach might not be desirable in situations where lawsuits 
alleging misconduct by management have seldom occurred. 
2. The Second Epistemic Axis: A Questioning State of Mind 
The second axis is the auditor’s attitude toward raising a question. There are two 
perspectives, a neutrality view and a presumptive-doubt view, depending on the extent of 
the auditor’s questioning state of mind. The former is the traditional view and the view 
held by GAAS. In addition, it is the view which management expects the auditor to hold. 
The presumptive-doubt view is more recent and not yet institutionally supported. 
However, although there is strong opposition, as shown in the international venue 
(Auditing Practices Board [2010] and [2011]), the audit practice appears to be moving 
toward that view.
The neutrality view of professional skepticism 
The neutrality view, later called the “neutral concept of professional skepticism” 
(Panel [2000], 76), is the attitude that the auditor should neither unquestionably assume 
management’s honesty nor flatly deny it, but should rather maintain neutrality on that 
question. This view, which has symbolically been called “healthy skepticism” and 
“reasonable skepticism,” was thepremise for empirical research on auditors’ evidence 
evaluation (Haynes [1999]). It emphasizes that the auditor should not unquestionably 
assume that management is honest, but should hold an unbiased view of management’s 
honesty (dishonesty). The neutrality view, however, becomes less tenable in actual audit 
practice.
Professional skepticism has so far been discussed in terms of the honesty or 
dishonesty of management, as it was introduced even in the Panel’s [2000] report. It has 
been the conventional way of discussing skepticism so far and therefore, it is difficult to 
find discussions that do not have that perspective. SAS No.82 and subsequent 
professional standards have taken only that perspective. A financial statement audit based 
on a presumption of dishonesty is not an actual practice, and such a presumption of 
dishonesty would be contrary to the audit culture, which the accounting profession has 
adopted. So is it critical to consider that perspective when professional skepticism is 
discussed?
The presumptive doubt view of professional skepticism 
Audit failures suggest that the approach based on neutrality has not been sufficient. 
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No matter how much professional skepticism the auditor exercised, management has 
been able to design very complex and skillful—and successful—schemes for fraudulent 
financial reporting. This fact indicates that the audit approach needs to shift from being 
“based on the neutrality view” to being “based on another view”: the presumptive doubt 
view. Bell et al. [2005] and Nelson [2009] have contributed to the recognition of this new 
perspective of skepticism. 
The presumptive doubt view stresses that the auditor take a proactive approach to 
audit evidence (in particular negative evidence), always keeping it in mind that 
management may have incentives to intentionally misstate amounts or disclosures. While 
such a skeptical attitude is essential in any audit setting, management may at times 
strongly oppose this audit orientation, as already pointed out by Nelson [2009]. 
Auditors cannot be held responsible for uncovering material misstatements caused 
by all types of fraud or illegal actions. Collusive frauds and other intricate schemes such as 
round-trip (circular) transactions are very difficult to uncover. Nor does this presumptive 
doubt orientation, mean that the GAAS audit should be restructured as forensic auditing. 
Emphasizing professional skepticism in the GAAS audit calls for the auditor no to 
exercise skepticism at the forensic level but to exercise constructive skepticism, to apply 
the audit risk approach more extensively, intensively, and more rigorously. Should 
auditors accept the fraud examiner’s advice on professional skepticism?
When gathering evidence, fraud examiners and auditors need to trust their instincts 
and check out their suspicions. Professional skepticism is really an enhancement of the 
“sixth sense” (Wells [2003], 80).Auditors under the GAAS audit should not appeal to 
“these pros think” but should start to explicitly recognize a negative assertion first. 
The audit risk approach was originally designed for auditors to effectively put their 
epistemic focus on uncovering material misstatements under economic constraints. This 
does not, however, allow auditors to make a blanket excuse that they have refrained from 
searching for fraud. Restructuring the framework of professional skepticism would 
increase the auditors’ chance to search out and uncover symptoms of fraud and other 
irregularities, resulting in material misstatements in the financial statements. 
VI. An Analysis of Each Framework Mode 
The GAAS audit (a financial statement audit performed under generally accepted 
auditing standards) has evolved under the continuing oversight of regulatory agencies, 
incessant litigation against CPA firms, and the social distrust of the independent audit 
function, but it has outgrown its responsiveness to professional skepticism. Professional 
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skepticism has a structural facet that is hard to handle in that an audit engagement is 
based on the mutual trust between management and an independent auditor and their 
presumed mutual efforts to attain a fair presentation of the financial statements. The 
expression “healthy” skepticism tells how sick the skepticism issue is in theory as well as in 
practice.
Professional skepticism cannot be discussed only in terms of the auditor’s 
questioning mind because the depth and breadth of an auditor’s questioning mind is 
influenced by the way of knowing which the auditor adopts. The previous section 
suggests four framework modes (Cells I to IV) of skepticism in auditing, which reflect 
different levels of audit effectiveness and efficiency. Each mode is explained below.
Mode I: The Positive approach with the Neutrality view 
Mode I designates a positive (affirmative) approach with a neutral view of 
professional skepticism, presupposing the Mautz postulate. The framework of traditional 
auditing procedures before the introduction of the audit risk approach appears to belong 
to Mode I. Management, as well as auditors, have favored this framework (the 
substantiation approach). Conversely, one might say that management is less favorably 
inclined to auditor skepticism. Behn et al. [1997]) provide empirical evidence of a 
significantly negative association between auditor skepticism and client satisfaction.  
Historically, an accounts audit conducted under the Companies Act in the 19th 
century in England could be regarded as one falling into Mode I, but in a looser sense. 
This conclusion can be traced in the court decision addressed to the Kingston Cotton 
Mill Company (Dicksee [1902], 615).
 He [the auditor] is entitled to assume that they [the directors] are honest and to rely 
upon their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If there is anything 
calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom, but in the absence 
of anything of that kind, he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful.  
But the neutrality view together with evidential positiveness might weaken or 
compromised the professional skepticism the auditor needs to exercise.
In a statement audit, the auditor is substantiating the amounts and disclosures in 
the financial statements. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (in particular, SAS No.1 
[1973] and its subsequent issues up toSAS No.39 [1981]) stipulated the general 
framework of substantiation called “substantive tests” in terms of “(a) tests of details of 
transactions and balances accounts” and “(b) analytical review of significant ratios and 
trends and resulting investigation of unusual fluctuations and questionable items” (SAS 
No.1 [1973], 320.70). “Normal audit procedures and other audit procedures as the 
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auditor deems necessary under given circumstances” appearing in the previous form of an 
independent auditor’s report constituted the framework for audit procedures.
Risk-orientation was quite limited at this stage, regardless of the observation that 
“the risk-assessment orientation. . . has been present in the financial statement auditing 
for at least 100 years”(Bell, et al. [2005], 8). Relative risk, the magnitude of possibility 
that a particular item in the financial statements will be inappropriately presented in 
comparison to the possibility that other items will be inappropriately presented, was the 
sole concept explicitly associated with an audit. The auditor’s risk consciousness was 
limited to that level. It was not extended either to an overall risk of financial statements or 
to other phases of audit risk.
The audit approach represented by Mode I came gradually but necessarily to 
undermine a reasonable basis for expressing an opinion on the financial statements. 
Schemes for fraudulent financial reporting became more skilful, more complex, and were 
often elaborated in collusion with third parties. These phenomena, starting to occur more 
often in the 1970s, outpacedthe depth of professional skepticism expected under Mode I. 
In other words, professional skepticism weakened or was compromised and as a result, 
audit risk increased. Consequently, the accounting profession started to slightly shift the 
traditional framework into one that was more risk conscious. Accounting professionals 
were taking an increasing interest in detecting “material misstatements” while still 
preserving the substantiation approach.
Mode II: The Negative approach with the Neutrality view
The traditional substantiation approach, represented by Mode I, was not considered 
effective enough in lessening audit risk. The so-called “audit risk approach,” introduced by 
SAS No.39 [1981], was designed to use audit resources effectively and efficiently to 
uncover material misstatements based on the assessment of business risk associated with 
the industry and operations of the client, the control risk of the client, and the inherent 
risk of accounts and disclosures prepared by the client. The audit risk approach prompted 
auditors to become more conscious of uncovering material misstatements, shifting the 
skepticism framework from Mode I to Mode II. At the initial stage, the auditor 
establishes “a degree of professional skepticism that is proper to achieve reasonable 
assurance that material errors or irregularities will be detected” (Wallace [1991], 19) and 
then brings the initial degree of skepticism into planning and performing the audit.
The present GAAS audit appears to belong to Mode II. Under the skeptical 
framework as shown in Mode II, auditors basically stay with substantiation while 
becoming more sensitive to the client risk (internal and external) and making negative 
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assertions depending on the client risk assessment. Under Mode II, auditors are 
encouraged to exercise a higher degree of professional skepticism in order to recognize 
fraud symptoms and then to follow up when they encounter a red flag. Their professional 
skepticism is confined to this level.  The key is whether the auditor has explicitly 
recognized a negative assertion (proposition) in a particular setting, adapted to whatever 
the heightened client risk may be. Behaviors such as “searching for more persuasive 
evidence,” “suspension of judgment,” and “search for knowledge” (Hurtt [2010], 153-
154) reflect the auditor’s more skeptical behaviors (though such behaviors are also 
conceivable under Mode I.)   
The audit risk approach is a strategic signal that the GAAS audit has changed its 
basic framework. At the same time, this approach does not increase its effectiveness when 
it is applied under Mode II because an explicit  recognition of negative assertions (in other 
words, an orientation toward negative evidence) is allowed under SAS No.53 only if the 
environment indicates a high risk of fraudulent financial reporting. Research by 
Hackenbrack [1993] suggests that risk assessment may influence the degree of 
professional skepticism. This research has not been extended to an analysis of assertion 
framing at the planning stage. The audit risk approach was criticized, in relation to the 
WorldCom audit failure by the Report of the Special Investigation Committee ([2003], 
226-227). What should be criticized, however, is not the audit risk approach itself but its 
application: (1) the auditor made an inadequate assessment of the client’s control risk and 
the client’s business risk, and (2) the auditor failed to inform the board of directors of the 
management’s restrictions on the auditing procedures.  
In summary, the Mode II framework allows the auditor to stay with substantiating 
positive assertions and not commonly scrutinizing negative assertions. In this sense, this 
audit risk approach has limited success because it cannot be fully applied as intended. 
Auditors might feel uncomfortable to explicitly recognizing negative assertions, in 
particular at the audit planning stage. Or they might refuse to do so. 
Mode III: The Positive approach with the Presumptive Doubt view 
The strength of the evidence furnished by the positive approach differs depending 
on whether the auditor takes the neutrality view or the presumptive doubt view of 
management’s honesty. Currently, SAS stipulates the neutrality view. The effectiveness of 
an audit risk approach is subject to constraints imposed by the framework of professional 
skepticism (Mode I) because the audit risk approach per se favors “the presumptive doubt 
view.”
The repeated disclosure of fraudulent financial reporting and other management 
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misconduct in public companies has raised the question of whether the real issue is 
whether management is honest or dishonest. The realization that management may have 
incentives to distort financial statements should encourage the audit profession to shift its 
framework of professional skepticism from “the neutrality view” to “the presumptive 
doubt view.” The Panel’s (88) recommendation that auditors modify the neutrality view of 
professional skepticism falls in line with Mode III, under which the auditor would be 
allowed to substantiate the amounts and/or disclosures in the financial statements based 
on the presumptive doubt view. Mode III is hypothetical, however, in that the 
presumptive doubt view is not currently taken by the Statements on Auditing Standards 5.
Bell et al. [2005] and Nelson [2009] are viewed by this author as academic efforts 
belonging to this Mode (rather than Mode IV), because they do not proactively 
presuppose negative assertions for the auditor’s scrutiny. The expressions “expectations” 
and/or “compare expectations & observations” used in Figure 3.2 (Bell et al. [2005], 23) 
state that they stay with “confirmation,” not with “falsification.” Their proposed audit 
evidence methodology, called “triangulation,” purports to confirm the evidence from the 
perspectives of three different evidence sources.
In addition, Nelson [2009] defines professional skepticism in auditing as “indicated 
by auditor judgments and decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an 
assertion is incorrect, conditional on the information available to the auditor” (33). This 
definition approaches professional skepticism in terms of the degree to which the auditor 
is sensitive to any material misstatement, but Nelson appears not to assume a negative 
assertion. Such an approach to the definition is in line with the idea that “the assessment 
of risk leads the auditor to choose some degree of professional skepticism”(Bloomfield 
[1997], 519). Both Bell et al. and Nelson pursue the substantiation approach:  the level of 
evidence which is required for a “reasonable basis” or “reasonable belief ” is increased and 
demands a more extensive exercise of professional skepticism. However, although more 
attention will be paid to the possibility of material misstatements in comparison with 
Modes I and II, as long as the auditor stays with Mode III, he/she is not allowed to 
positively or proactively establish negative assertions for scrutiny. 
5 The Auditing Practices Board has recognized in its recent discussion paper ([2010], 6) 
that” the recently updated Auditing Standards can be characterized as reflecting a 
presumptive doubt approach” and has also stated that “an attitude of presumptive doubt 
is reinforced in ISA (UK and Ireland) 240…. .” But, there has been adverse reaction from 
the accounting profession (The Auditing Practices Board [2011], 6-7).
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Mode IV: The Negative approach with the Presumptive Doubt view 
Mode IV is also hypothetical. No approaches to audit evidence so far have assumed 
negative assertions in verifying the principal proposition.  However, unlike the first three 
approaches, Mode IV demands that the auditor proactively and explicitly recognize 
negative propositions starting at the planning stage. In other words, the auditor designs 
program that targets uncovering material misstatements, based on extensive and informed 
assessment of the client’s business risk, internal and external. In particular, the auditor 
pays attention to any negative signal which may lead to material misstatements, both in 
gathering and in assessing the evidence. The auditor finally determines whether the 
evidence falls into an acceptable range of audit risk (the risk that the auditor will 
incorrectly accept management’s assertions as true) by ascertaining that negative 
propositions are evidentially negated. 
The GAAS audit does not anticipate deceit. If deceit is suspected, the auditor will 
not accept the engagement. But once the engagement is done, the auditor mustascertain 
whether any material misstatements could be caused by deceit. The auditing profession 
has recognizes that corporate scandals and/or management fraud have often escaped 
detection until an enterprise has suffered irreparable damage or bankruptcy. The history 
of independent audits tells us that experience with many types of fraud schemes may not 
adequately prepare an auditor to recognize other schemes. There is no “cookbook” 
approach to detecting fraud that results in material misstatements (Levy [1985], 87). This 
is the lesson which the accounting profession must learn from its history. 
The only way to prepare auditors to recognize fraud is to sharpen their 
inquisitiveness, to increase their sensitivity to fraud, and to put it another way, to 
strengthen the depth of professional skepticism starting at the audit planning stage (at the 
level of recognizing an assertion).The frameworks of professional skepticism represented 
by Modes I, II, and III naturally lessen their own effectiveness to varying degrees 
depending on the extent to which the auditor is allowed to explicitly consider negative 
assertions. A financial statement audit needs to be more robustly contested by bringing 
the conventional posture of professional skepticism into a new domain. 
VII. Concluding Remarks  
Audit research has begun to step more into analyses of the effects of confirming 
evidence and disconfirming evidence in the process of forming the auditor’s beliefs, the 
evidence proneness in the audit planning stage, and their relationship with professional 
skepticism. From the standpoint of professional skepticism, however, empirical research 
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so far has dealt almost exclusively with how the disconfirming evidence uncovered during 
the audit process affects the auditors’ degree of professional skepticism and audit 
judgments. This suggests that within the framework of professional skepticism (Mode I 
and II) the research has taken up confirming evidence and in particularly disconfirming 
evidence. In the first place, the auditors being studied may not have had the mindset to 
recognize explicitly negative assertions (negative propositions), or if they did, it may have 
been very weak. In general, auditors may be unskilled at dealing with negative assertions 
and their implications. 
Changing the framework of professional skepticism from Modes I and II to III and 
even to IV, basically means that auditors approach the entire evidence process in terms of 
negative assertions. Mode IV is the framework to most strongly and fully consider 
negative assertions. In this sense, a shift in the framework of professional skepticism and 
the auditor’s mindset would require a large change both in audit evidence theory and in 
audit practice. The author notices that “growing public sentiment demands that auditors 
should be fraud detectives”(Venuti et al. [2002], 33). Model IV is not intended at all, 
however, to provide a framework for auditors acting as fraud detectives. 
This paper, recognizing that professional skepticism eventually reflects individual 
personal traits and is in essence a psychological trait, takes a position that, in addition to 
the personal nature, it is epistemic/philosophical, organizational, economic, structural, 
and environmental in the sense that it will be subject to influences from the client 
relationship. Professional skepticism must be understood as a multi-faceted concept.      
Audit research, no matter its form, that attempts to measure the depth and breadth 
of professional skepticism must struggle not only with its hybrid structure, but also with 
the difficulty of its multifaceted structure. Professional skepticism is a more difficult and 
broader concept than one would imagine. In this sense, research into professional 
skepticism in auditing has only just begun. 
To conclude this paper, the author would like to borrow the following passage from 
“The Social Scientist’s Obligation” with which Gilovich ([1991], 194) finishes his book:  
 What is most important, then, is not dispelling particular erroneous beliefs (although 
there is surely some merit in that), but creating an understanding of how we form 
erroneous beliefs. To truly appreciate the complexities of the world and the 
intricacies of human experience, it is essential to understand how we can be misled 
by the apparent evidence of everyday experience. This, in turn, requires that we 
think clearly about our experience, question our assumptions, and challenge what 
we think we know.
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